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Abstract. In 2010 Hao, Ryan and Zielinski proposed a simple decen-
tralized e-voting protocol that only requires 2 rounds of communication.
Thus, for k elections their protocol needs 2k rounds of communication.
Observing that the first round of their protocol is aimed to establish
the public-keys of the voters, we propose an extension of the protocol
as a non-interactive e-voting scheme in the public-key setting (NIVS)
in which the voters, after having published their public-keys, can use
the corresponding secret-keys to participate in an arbitrary number of
one-round elections.
We first construct a NIVS with a standard tally function where the
number of votes for each candidate is counted.
Further, we present constructions for two alternative types of elections.
Specifically in the first type (dead or alive elections) the tally shows if at
least one voter cast a vote for the candidate. In the second one (elections
by unanimity), the tally shows if all voters cast a vote for the candidate.
Our constructions are based on bilinear groups of prime order.
As definitional contribution we provide formal computational definitions
for privacy and verifiability of NIVSs. We conclude by showing intriguing
relations between our results, secure computation, electronic exams and
conference management systems.
Keywords: e-voting, bilinear maps, secure computation, electronic exams,
conference management systems.
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1 Introduction
Background. In 2010 Hao, Ryan and Zielinski [HRZ10] (see also [KSRH12])
designed a simple decentralized e-voting protocol that only needs 2 rounds of
communication and is (publicly) verifiable. Their protocol for n participants can
be summarized as follows. Let us assume that a trusted authority sets up a Diffie-
Hellman [DH76] group G of prime order p with generator g. In the first round,
each voter j chooses a secret element xj ← Zp and forwards gxj to the public
bulletin-board. Now, each voter j computes the value gyj
4
= g
∑
k<j xk−
∑
k>j xk
and in the second round sends her ballot Bltj
4
= gvjgxjyj , where vj ∈ {0, 1} is
her vote.
From the values Bltj ’s the tally can be computed as the product, in fact it is
easy to see that
∏
j∈[n] g
xjyj = 1 and thus r
4
=
∏
j∈[n] Bltj = g
∑
vj .
Assuming that the result is small it can be computed by computing the discrete
log of r in base g. The previous explanation is an oversimplification that skips
some aspects, like zero-knowledge proofs for verifiability, that we will take into
consideration later.
1.1 Multiple non-interactive elections in the PK setting
The Public-key Setting. The first round of the protocol outlined above can
be viewed as the publication of the public-key (PK, henceforth) of the users.
That is, we can imagine the element gxj as the PK of user j and xj as her
secret-key (SK, henceforth). After establishing these pairs of PKs/SKs the voter
can cast her vote non-interactively (i.e., in a single round of interaction).
Note also that non-interactive e-voting is provable impossible to achieve without
the PK setting because it clashes with any reasonable notion of privacy. In fact,
if it was possible to compute the result of a YES/NO election from a tuple S of n
ballots computed in a non-interactive way, then it would be possible to perform
the following attack: discard the first n − 1 ballots in S and replace them with
another tuple of ballots that all encode the vote for 0, and compute the tally to
learn the vote of the n-th voter in S.
We thus raise the following question:
In a PK setting, can we achieve a protocol that allows the voters to
participate in an unbounded number of non-interactive elections? That is,
after the users make public their PKs, while retaining the corresponding
SKs, is it possible for them to engage in an unbounded number of one-
round voting protocols?
The protocol of Hao et al. fails to satisfy this property. In fact, even if we
consider the first round in their scheme as the establishment of the PKs/SKs
and the voters make two non-interactive elections then the privacy is completely
broken. The reason is that two ballots belonging to the same voter leak the
difference of the votes.
We solve this issue by resorting to bilinear maps [BF01,Jou04]. Our new pro-
tocol extends the one of Hao et al. as follows. First of all, we will associate a
unique identifier id ∈ {0, 1}λ to each election. These identifiers could be con-
secutive numbers, 1, 2, . . . or some other unique identifiers announced for each
election, e.g. containing the election date. That is, voters will associate an iden-
tifier id to their ballots and only ballots for the same identifier (i.e. for the same
election) can be put together to compute the tally.
Let us assume a bilinear instance I 4= (p,G,GT , e) (see section 2.2) in which
G is a group of prime order p and e is a bilinear function mapping elements of
G to elements of GT satisfying non-degeneracy and bilinearity, and let Hash be
a hash function taking as input I, an identifier of an election id and outputs
elements of G. In our analysis Hash will be modeled as a Random Oracle (RO,
in short) model [BR93]. Our protocol in the PK setting is described next.
All voters randomly choose their secret-key xj ← Zp and publish their public-
key Pkj = g
xj . Each voter computes a random value Hash(I, id) ∈ G to be used
in the election associated with identifier id.
In election id each voter j will cast her vote1 vj as
Bltj
4
= e(gyj ,Hash(I, id))xj · e(gvj ,Hash(I, id)),
where gyj is computed from the PKs gxj ’s exactly as in the Hao et al.’s protocol
described above. As will be explained below, the ballot is cast with a proof of
well-formedness.
If we define gid
4
= e(g,Hash(I, id)), the ballot can be written as Bltj =
g
vj
id g
xjyj
id and the relation to Hao et al.’s approach becomes clear. In the tar-
get group of the bilinear map, we have constructed a hash function creating new
generators for each election in such a way that the PK for any participant, in the
new generator, can be calculated by any other participant, but the corresponding
SKs stay unchanged and secret.
Privacy game. This new model calls for new security definitions. We define the
privacy for non-interactive e-voting schemes in the PK setting (NIVS, in short)
by means of the following game.
The challenger computes a pair of PK/SK for each voter and feeds the adversary
with the PKs. Then a random bit b is chosen and the adversary can adaptively
make an unbounded number of queries to an oracle invoking it with two sets of
votes, S0 and S1 with the same sum and receiving back the ballots computed
with Sb by means of the SKs. At any point the adversary can output its guess
b′ and it wins the game iff b′ = b.
A formal definition that also takes in account an adversary that corrupts a set
of voters seeing their SKs, and allows for non-standard tally functions, is given
in section 2.1.
We will prove the following theorem.
1 In the following the term e(gvj ,Hash(I, id)) could be replaced without loss of gen-
erality by e(gvj , g).
Theorem 1 If the Bilinear Decision Diffie-Hellman Assumption [Boy08] defined
in section 2.2 holds, then in the RO model no non-uniform PPT adversary can
break the privacy (see Definition 2) of the scheme of section 3 with non-negligible
probability.
The proof is given in section 3.1. Note that the privacy definition does not capture
e.g. vote copying attacks. In fact, it implicitly assumes a perfect synchronous
broadcast channel. We postpone a stronger ballot privacy definition for future
work.
Verifiability. As a further definitional contribution we provide a formal defini-
tion for verifiability. Verifiability for NIVSs is somewhat different from schemes
with trusted authorities. For example everybody, also third parties, can perform
the tally. Further we will think of being in a setting where the ballots and proofs
are cast using authenticated channels using the PK structure. Alternatively sig-
natures can be added. This prevents attacks where an adversary votes on behalf
of another voter. Intuitively verifiability should then guarantee the ability of
verifying that a voter cast a ballot according to the vote rules and that the tally
has ideal functionality. First of all, let us analyze how a well-formed ballot look
like.
We expect that a well-formed ballot gives consistent results with other honestly
computed ballots. That is, a ballot Blt should uniquely determine a vote v that,
along with any other set of valid ballots, results in a consistent computation.
Our definition of verifiability given in section 2.1 is divided in two parts (that
have to hold together). The first part states that a ballot uniquely determines a
vote v such that for any other set of ballots corresponding to another vector of
votes v, the output of the algorithm that computes the tally will be equal either
to the output of the functionality with inputs v and v or to an error ⊥.
The second part states that there exists an algorithm VerifyBallot whose aim is
to verify the well-formedness of a ballot Blt such that if the verification passes
for Blt then for any other set B of honestly computed ballots, the result of the
tally with respect to the set of ballots B ∪ {Blt} will not result in an error ⊥.
In order to guarantee verifiability of the above sketched NIVS, like in Hao et al.,
we add proofs of well-formedness of the ballot. Specifically we add a proof that
the vote in the ballot is 0 or 1 using the Cramer et al. technique adapted to the
bilinear setting. We discuss this in section 2.3.
We stress that the proof of well-formedness of the ballot is sufficient to satisfy
our notion of verifiability. Unlike Hao et al. we do not add proofs of knowledge
to the public-keys as in our model we do not capture malleability or copying
attacks, however, it straightforward to add these proofs of knowledge.
We note that this protocol is not fair, e.g. the last to cast a ballot can compute
the result before casting her own vote. As explained in [KSRH12] this can be
mitigated by an extra commitment round. Also the protocol is not robust, i.e.
we cannot tally if someone fails to vote. This was also considered in [KSRH12]
and in this event it is enough to run an extra round for the remaining voters to
recover the tally result of the votes that has been cast.
1.2 Beyond YES/NO elections
The drawback of the previous scheme is that it only supports YES/NO elections.
Hao et al. showed how to extend their basic scheme to handle multiple candidates
by using parallel repetition, i.e., making the voter to cast a ciphertext for any
candidate. They mention possible improvements with better communication ef-
ficiency at the cost of having a very expensive tallying procedure. However, none
of their solutions support multiple elections.
Multiple candidates. The techniques of Hao et al. for handling multiple can-
didates also extend to our context in a natural way. However, we can do even
better. The point is that in the same way that we can construct independent gen-
erators for each election, we can also inside each election construct independent
generators for each candidate gid,a = e(g,Hash(I, id, a)) where a ∈ {1, . . . , c}
and we have c candidates. Voter j now casts c ballots Bltj,a = g
vj,a
id,a g
xjyj
id,a where
vj,a is 1 for the chosen candidate and 0 otherwise. The voter gives a single zero-
knowledge proof along with the ballots. Namely, she gives an OR-proof that the
El Gamal encryption (
∏
a g
xj
id,a,
∏
a Bltj,a) is an encryption of one of the elements
in the set {gid,1, . . . , gid,c}. Unlike the parallel approach of Hao et al. the voter
can only cast one vote and we thus have a standard c-candidate election. Note
that it is also differs from the case in Hao et al. where each candidate has a
special generator, but where only a single ballot is cast since privacy is other-
wise broken. The advantage is here a more efficient tally. Where the vote casting
part scales roughly with c, the big advantage is that the tally part is almost as
efficient as in the YES/NO case since the brute force calculation of the tally
requires maximally n comparisons with exponentiated generators.
However in this work we also present a novel approach to support multiple
elections in the PK setting for elections using special tally functions.
Dead or alive elections. In the sequel we consider two special YES/NO elec-
tions and when we say that the voter casts (resp. does not cast) a vote for the
candidate, we mean that she casts 1 (resp. 0). In the first one, that we call dead
or alive elections, we have 1 candidate and the tally has to compute the predi-
cate P6=0 that is true iff at least one voter casts a vote for the candidate.
The idea is to change the previous NIVS for YES/NO elections so that if
the j-th voter casts a vote for 0 she sets vj = 0, otherwise she sets vj to
a random number in Zp. That is, the ballot Bltj will be defined as Bltj
4
=
e(gyj ,Hash(id, I))xj · e(gvj ,Hash(id, I)), but with vj set as described.
As before, the product of the e(gyj ,Hash(id, I))xj ’s will cancel out when tal-
lying. Hence, only the product of the e(gvj ,Hash(id, I))’s will be left. Therefore,
this part will be null if and only if no voter cast a vote for the candidate. Note
that here, as the result is Boolean, we do not need to make a brute-force com-
putation to extract the result and thus to assume that the number of voters be
small.
Elections by unanimity. With a similar technique we can handle elections by
unanimity, in which the tally has to compute the predicate P∀ that is true iff
all voters cast a vote for the candidate.The idea is similar to the former except
that in a ballot for voter j we invert the setting of vj by choosing vj = 0 if the
voter wants to cast a 1 vote or choosing vj at random in Zp if the voter wants
to cast a 0 vote. Note that in this case the e(gvj ,Hash(id, I))-part will be null if
and only if all voters cast a vote for the candidate.
For both dead or alive elections and elections by unanimity, it would be better
(to prevent further attacks not considered in our model) that the votes be cast
with a proof of knowledge of vj , though not adding any proof does not break
neither the privacy nor verifiability as defined.2
Let us also stress that the privacy notion of NIVSs with non-standard tally
function does not follow the intuition from elections with a central authority. The
point is that due to the very nature of non-interactive elections, any voter can
not only calculate the result of the election, but she can also calculate what the
result would be if she had cast a different vote. For tallying with the standard
candidate sum function this does not give any new information, but for non-
standard tally functions this can in certain cases give more information than
voting with a central authority. To exemplify, consider an election by unanimity
in the special case where a single voter casts NO and all the rest vote YES. The
outcome of the unanimity election is then NO. However, the voter casting the
NO can also recalculate what the result would have been if she had voted YES,
and gets the result YES. From this she can conclude that all other voters voted
YES. This does not violate privacy in the NIVS definition, but is certainly differ-
ent from privacy in elections with a central authority. Theoretically, a possible
way to change this is to introduce a player that acts like an extra voter, who
casts a YES ballot in a secret way, and calculates and publishes the YES/NO
outcome of the election with this extra YES vote, and finally proves his honesty
in zero-knowledge. This player does not need special trust, in the worst case,
where this player colludes with another voter, the privacy will decrease to NIVS
privacy.
We also mention that both schemes could be extended to support multiple
candidates using bilinear groups of composite order but we skip the details.
A drawback of the above constructions (for dead or alive elections and elections
by unanimity) is that if an adversary, who is a participating voter, manages to
perform a privacy attack on voter j and gets to know vj , then this adversary
can cancel the vote of j by voting −vj . That is, a privacy attack can be turned
into an undetectable verifiability attack. In the setting of composite groups we
also plan to repair on this. However, we stress that these attacks are not taken
in account by our security model but in a future work we will generalize it to
withstand stronger attacks.
2 Precisely, for the verifiability to hold, it is sufficient to check that the ballot be a
valid group element, as any group element is in the range of the Cast algorithm.
1.3 Relation to secure computation
Our results relate to secure computation [Yao82,Gol04] of specific functionali-
ties. A recent result of Garg et al. [GGHR14] showed the first 2-rounds secure
computation protocol in the CRS model for any functionality.
However, even if we wish to use the protocol of Garg et al. to execute k secure
evaluations of the functions described in this paper, we would need 2k rounds
of communication. Instead, using our NIVSs we only need k+ 1 rounds, one for
establishing the PKs and one for each non-interactive secure function evaluation
(of the functions supported by our schemes) in the PK setting.
Another related cryptographic notion is Input-Indistinguishable Computation
proposed by Micali, Pass and Rosen [MPR06] that shares the indistinguishability-
based flavor of NIVS but was implemented with more rounds than ours (though
the main focus of the authors was on general functionalities and security under
concurrent executions).
It seems that Multi-input Functional Encryption (MIFE, in short) [GGG+14]
could be also used to obtain a form of a NIVS in the CRS model (setting the
CRS to a token for the desired function). However, this is not straightforward
since MIFE would have to be likely combined with signature schemes and, as the
indistinguishability-security of MIFE only holds when the two challenge vectors
of inputs are not ’splittable’ under the functionality,3 it would offer no security
guarantee because in this case there exist many values splitting the challenge vec-
tors.4 A generalization of MIFE studied by Iovino and Z˙ebrowski [IZ15] could
be useful in this context.
It is an intriguing research direction to investigate the class of functionalities we
can compute in our setting.
1.4 Applications to secure conference management systems and
e-exams
Our results are applicable also in the context of secure exams and conference
management. In fact, the voters can represent the examiners (or reviewers) who
assign a grade to a homework (or scientific paper), and the tally corresponds to
its evaluation. More specifically, let [d] be the set of possible grades. Our first
NIVS for YES/NO elections can be easily extended to support votes (that now
will represent grades) in [d] so that the tally divided by the number of examiners
would give the average grade for the homework.
Our schemes for dead or alive elections and elections by unanimity could be
also useful for the review process of a conference management system.
3 For instance a value z splits two vectors (x1, x2) and (y1, y2) under a function f if
f(x1, z) 6= f(y1, z) or f(z, x2) 6= f(z, y2). Two vectors are splittable if there exists a
value z that splits them.
4 Precisely, whereas it would be difficult to find an input that splits the two challenge
vectors under the functionality (as it accounts to forge a signature), such splitting
inputs exist and thus the security of MIFE is vacuous.
Our NIVS can be used to get a first evaluation of a paper from the commit-
tee members who are involved into the review process. The goal is to preserve
anonymity of the review grades also towards the chair, that is, a form of strong
blind reviewing. Here, a vote for 1 corresponds to acceptance and a vote for 0 to
rejection (as said before, the scheme can be easily extended to support different
grades such as borderline). The chair of the conference who is in charge for ac-
cepting or rejecting a paper computes the tally to get a first evaluation of the
paper without knowning the grades assigned by each reviewers to the paper.
If a paper gets a very high (resp. very low) average grade, then the chair can
easily take the final decision, otherwise he may assign “Maybe Accept” (resp.
“Maybe Reject”) to the paper. If a paper has been assigned the grade of “Maybe
Accept”, the chair may call for a dead or alive election to reject the paper iff
all committee members will vote rejection. On the other hand, if the paper has
been assigned the grade of “Maybe Reject”, the chair may call for an election by
unanimity to accept the paper iff all committee members agree on acceptance.
Similarly, we expect further applications of our work to secure exams in
general.
1.5 Our results in a nutshell
Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
– A new model. We introduce the novel concept of non-interactive voting
schemes in the PK setting that extends the two-rounds elections of Hao et al..
In this model, n voters publish their public-keys retaining the corresponding
secret-keys, and each voter using her secret-key can compute her ballot and
send it to a public bulletin board. Then, the n ballots can be put together
to compute the result of the election.
Therefore, in this model k elections can be executed with k + 1 rounds
of communications whereas using Hao et al.’s schemes would result in 2k
rounds.
– Formal definitions. In section 2.1 we provide formal definitions for non-
interactive voting schemes in the PK setting, in particular for privacy and
verifiability, for which a formal treatment was missing.
– Scheme for YES/NO elections. In section 3 we present a non-interactive
voting scheme in the PK setting for YES/NO elections (i.e, in which each
voter can cast 0 or 1 and the tally computes the sum of all votes) that is
provably secure from the Bilinear Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption.
– Alternative types of elections. In section 1.2 we presented schemes for
alternative types of (YES/NO) elections that could be of independent inter-
est. In particular we can support a dead or alive election in which n voters
can choose 1 candidate and the result shows for if at least one voter cast a
vote for him. Another type of election we support is election by unanimity,
in which the result shows if all voters cast a vote for the candidate.
We implemented our NIVSs for YES/NO, dead or alive and unanimity elec-
tions using the pbc library [Lyn] and we tested them on a laptop equipped
with an Intel Core i7 getting quite good performances.
– Relation to secure computation. In section 1.3 we show relations be-
tween our results and secure computation.
– Applications to secure electronic exams and conference systems.
In section 1.4 we show that our results have direct applications to secure
electronic exams and conference management systems.
2 Definitions
Notation. A negligible function negl(k) is a function that is smaller than the
inverse of any polynomial in k (from a certain point and on). We denote by [n]
the set of numbers {1, . . . , n}, and we shorten Probabilistic Polynomial-Time as
PPT. If g and A are elements of the same cyclic group, we denote by dloggA
the discrete log of A in base g. If S is a finite set we denote by a← S the process
of setting a equal to a uniformly chosen element of S.
2.1 Non-interactive voting scheme in the PK setting
A non-interactive voting scheme in the PK setting (NIVS, in short) is associated
with a natural number n > 0, the number of voters, a set D, the domain of valid
votes, a set Σ, the range of possible results, and a count function F : Dn → Σ.
After that an authority sets-up the public parameters pp, each voter generates a
pair of public- and secret- keys. By means of an algorithm Cast and of her own
secret-key each voter can cast her vote v ∈ D generating a ballot Blt and, using
the public-keys of all voters, the tally can be publicly computed by means of an
algorithm EvalTally. A single ballot can be verified to be the output of the Cast
algorithm with input a valid vote v ∈ D and with respect to a public-key of a
voter by means of the algorithm VerifyBallot.
Definition 1 [Non-Interactive Voting Scheme] A (n,D,Σ, F )-non-interactive
voting scheme in the PK setting NIVS for number of voters n, domain of valid
voters D, range of possible results Σ and count function F is a tuple
NIVS
4
= (Setup,KeyGen,Cast,VerifyBallot,EvalTally) of 5 PPT algorithms with
the following syntax:
1. Setup(1λ), on input the security parameter in unary, outputs public param-
eters pp.
2. KeyGen(pp), on input the public parameters pp outputs a public-key Pk and
a secret-key Sk.
3. Cast(pp, j, id,Sk, (Pk)i∈[n]−{j}, v), on input the public parameters pp, the
secret-key Sk of voter j, the identifier id ∈ {0, 1}λ of the election, the public
keys (Pki)i∈[v]−{j} of the other voters, and a vote v ∈ D, outputs a ballot
Blt;
4. VerifyBallot(pp,Pk, id,Blt), on input the public parameters pp, a public-key
Pk of a voter, the identifier id ∈ {0, 1}λ of the election and a ballot Blt,
outputs a value in {⊥,OK};
5. EvalTally(pp,Pk1, . . . ,Pkn, id,Blt1, . . . ,Bltn), on input the public parameters
pp, the public-keys of all voters, the identifier id ∈ {0, 1}λ of the election,
and the ballots cast by all voter, outputs y ∈ Σ ∪ {⊥}.
Correctness and verifiability. In addition we require the following properties.
1. Correctness or self-tallying. For all pp← Setup(1λ), for all
(Pk1,Sk1), . . . , (Pkn,Skn) such that for all i ∈ [n] (Pki,Ski) ← KeyGen(pp),
all v1, . . . , vn ∈ D, for all identifiers id ∈ {0, 1}λ, for all Blt1, . . . ,Bltn such
that for all i ∈ [v] Blti ← Cast(pp, j, id,Sk, (Pk)i∈[n]−{j}, v), we have that
EvalTally(pp,Pk1, . . . ,Pkn, id,Blt1, . . . ,Bltn) = F (v1, . . . , vn).
2. Verifiability or dispute-freeness. To not overburden the presentation, we first
present a simplified notion of verifiability against one malicious voter and
then we will discuss how to extend it to withstand any number of malicious
voters. The definition of verifiability against one malicious voter is the fol-
lowing.
For all pp← Setup(1λ), all j ∈ [n], all Pk, all Blt, there exists a vote v ∈ D
such that:
for all identifiers id ∈ {0, 1}λ, all except negligible fraction of 5 (Pki,Ski)i∈[n]−{j}
such that for all i ∈ [n]− {j} (Pki,Ski)← KeyGen(pp), and all vi ∈ D with
i ∈ [n] − {j} and all except negligible fraction of (Blti)i∈[n]−{j} satisfying
Blti ← Cast(pp, i, id,Sk, (Pk)j∈[n]−{i}, vi), it holds that EvalTally(pp,Pk1, . . . ,
Pkj−1,Pk,Pkj+1, . . . ,Pkn, id,Blt1, . . . ,Bltj−1,Blt,Bltj+1, . . . ,Bltn) outputs ei-
ther F (v1, . . . , vj−1, v, vj+1, . . . , vn) or ⊥.
In addition, we require the following to hold. For all pp← Setup(1λ), for all
j ∈ [n], all Pk, all Blt, if VerifyBallot(pp,Pk, id,Blt) = OK then:
for all identifiers id ∈ {0, 1}λ, all except negligible fraction of (Pki,Ski)i∈[n]−{j}
such that for all i ∈ [n] − {j} (Pki,Ski) ← KeyGen(pp), all v1, . . . , vn1 ∈ D,
all except negligible fraction of (Blti)i∈[n]−{j} such that for all i ∈ [v]− {j}
Blti ← Cast(pp, j, id,Sk, (Pk)i∈[n]−{j}, v), it holds that EvalTally(pp,Pk1, . . . ,
Pkj−1,Pk,Pkj+1, . . . ,Pkn, id,Blt1, . . . ,Bltj−1,Blt,Bltj+1, . . . ,Bltn) 6=⊥.
As mentioned before, the above definition only takes in account a single
malicious voter because we quantify over a single, possibly malicious, voter
j, a single, possibly maliciously computed, PK Pk of voter j and a single,
possibly maliciously computed, ballot Blt of voter j. By quantifying over all
sets of up to n voters and changing it in the obvious way we get the actual
definition.
5 In the sequel, we use the expression “all except negligible fraction of...” to mean that
the statement holds for all except negligible fraction of the randomness values which
the object is computed from. For instance, by “for all except negligible fraction of
(Pki, Ski)i∈[n]−{j} such that for all i ∈ [n] − {j} (Pki, Ski) ← KeyGen(pp)...” we
mean that for all except negligible fraction of the randomness values r ∈ {0, 1}λ, for
(Pki, Ski)i∈[n]−{j} such that for all i ∈ [n]− {j} (Pki,Ski)← KeyGen(pp; r)...
Finally, we mention that we are only able to construct NIVSs satisfying this
definition but in the RO model where the definition is changed in the obvious
way so as to hold in probability over the choices of the RO.
Privacy. Now we formalize the notion of privacy (also called maximal ballot pri-
vacy in Hao et al.) in the style of indistinguishability-based security for encryp-
tion and related primitives. The privacy for a (n,D,Σ, F )-NIVS NIVS
4
= (Setup,
KeyGen,Cast,VerifyBallot,EvalTally) is formalized by means of the following game
Privn,D,Σ,F,NIVSA between an adversary (with access to an oracle) A
4
= (A0,A1)
and a challenger C.
Privn,D,Σ,F,NIVSA (1
λ)
– Setup phase. C generates pp← Setup(1λ), choose a random bit b← {0, 1} and runs
A0 on input pp;
– Corruption phase. A0, on input pp, outputs a set S ⊂ [n] of indices of voters it wants
to corrupt.
– Key Generation Phase. For all i ∈ [n] the challenger generates n pairs of public- and
secret- keys (Pki, Ski) ← KeyGen(pp), and runs AVote(·)1 on input (Pki, Ski)i∈S and
(Pki)i∈[n]−S .
– Query phase. The adversary A1 has access to a stateful oracle Vote. The
oracle Vote on input an identifier id ∈ {0, 1}λ and a pair of vectors
v0
4
= (v0,1, . . . , v0,n) and v1
4
= (v1,1, . . . , v1,n) outputs the set of ballots
(Cast(pp, 1, id, Sk1, (Pki)i∈[n]−{1}, vb,1), . . . ,Cast(pp, n, id, Skn, (Pki)i∈[n]−{n}, vb,n).
– Output. At some point the adversary outputs its guess b′.
– Winning condition. The adversary wins the game if the following conditions hold:
1. b′ = b.
2. v0,i = v1,i for any i ∈ S.
3. for any pair of vectors (v0,v1) for which A asked a query to the oracle Vote it
holds that: for any vector v, F (v′0) = F (v
′
1) where for b = 0, 1 v
′
b is the vector
equal to v in all indices in S and equal to vb elsewhere.
4. S has cardinality < n, v0 and v1 are vectors of n values in D and id ∈ {0, 1}λ.
The advantage of adversary A in the above game is defined as
AdvNIVS,PrivA (1
λ)
4
= |Prob[Privn,DΣ,F,NIVSA (1λ) = 1]− 1/2|
Definition 2 We say that NIVS for parameters (n,D,Σ, F ) is private if all PPT
adversaries A 4= (A0,A1) have at most negligible advantage in the above game.
Remark 1 We make some remarks on the previous definitions.
– Perfect synchronous broadcast channel. Our security definition implic-
itly assumes a synchronous broadcast channel and as such does not model
e.g. malleability and copying attacks.
– Parameterization. A (n,D,Σ, F )-NIVS is fully specified only for the 4 pa-
rameters n,D,Σ and F , but often for simplicity we will drop the parameters
and we will talk about a NIVS when it is clear from the context.
– Supporting multiple functions. It is possible to extend the definition of
a (n,D,Σ, F )-NIVS by replacing the function F with a set of functions F
so as to have a system that in each election can allow to evaluate the tally
according to any function f ∈ F. In this case, the setup algorithm has to take
as additional input a finite description of the set and the other algorithms
have to take as additional input a certain function f ∈ F. The correctness,
verifiability and privacy have to be changed accordingly. We point out that
our NIVSs for YES/NO elections, for dead or alive elections and for elections
by unanimity can be easily unified in a single NIVS for the set of the three
corresponding functions.
– Verifiability. Note that the first part of the verifiability states that a bal-
lot uniquely determines a single vote v that is compatible with any other
correctly computed set of ballots. The second part guarantees that the
VerifyBallot algorithm can discover whether a ballot is cast correctly. Thus,
if the check is satisfies (i.e., with output OK), it means that for a given ballot
Blt, any set of n− 1 correctly computed ballots, will give consistent results.
– Constant or polynomial number of voters. The reader may have no-
ticed that we leave unspecified the relation between the parameter n and
the security parameter. In more cases, setting n to a constant is enough.
However one could set n to be any polynomial in the security parameter.
– Programmable RO. Actually we will assume a definition of privacy iden-
tical to the one we formulated except that it is in the (programmable) RO
model. In this case the adversary will have, in addition, oracle access to a
function O drawn at random from the space of functions O that map {0, 1}λ
to some space Σ, but possibly modified by a PPT simulator in a polynomial
(in λ) number of points. We skip the details of the formal definitions.
In our schemes we assume that the adversary has access to more than one
oracle, but using standard techniques this could be changed into a single
oracle, but we refrain from doing it here since it complicates the description.
We also require a definition of verifiability that holds in probability over the
choices of the RO.
– CRS vs public-coin model. The public parameters can be seen as a CRS,
so one can wonder whether there is difference between the public-coin model
and the CRS model. The difference is that in the CRS model the party that
generates the public parameters is not trusted (though we mention that the
trust could be distributed among a set of trusted parties in a threshold way),
whereas in the standard model the security should hold even with respect
to the party who generated the parameters.
The above definition of privacy only takes in account the CRS model but
can be changed to the standard model by allowing the adversary to see the
random coins with which the public parameters are generated. We stress
that our construction of Section 3 satisfies this stronger definition assuming
a variant of BDDH (see Section 2.2).
2.2 Bilinear maps
In this section we describe the bilinear setting with groups of prime order and
the assumption that we will use to prove the privacy of the NIVSs presented in
Sections 3 and 1.2.
Prime order bilinear groups. Prime order bilinear groups were first used in
Cryptography by Boneh and Franklin [BF01], and Joux [Jou04]. We suppose the
existence of an efficient group generator algorithm G which takes as input the
security parameter λ and outputs a description I 4= (p,G,GT , e) of a bilinear
instance of prime order, where G and GT are cyclic groups of prime order p, and
e : G×G→ GT is a map with the following properties:
1. (Bilinearity): ∀ g, h ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp it holds that e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab.
2. (Non-degeneracy): ∃ g ∈ G such that e(g, g) has order p in GT .
Bilinear Decision Diffie-Hellman Assumption. More formally, we have the
following definition. First pick a random bilinear instance I 4= (p,G,GT , e) ←
G(1λ) and then pick g ← G, a, b, c, z ← Zp , and set D 4= (I, g, ga, gb, gc),
T0
4
= e(g, g)abc and T1
4
= e(g, g)z. We define the advantage of any A in breaking
the BDDH Assumption (with respect to G) to be
AdvA,GBDDH(λ)
4
= |Prob[A(D,T0) = 1]− Prob[A(D,T1) = 1]| .
We say that Assumption BDDH holds for generator G if for all non-uniform
PPT algorithms A, AdvA(λ),GBDDH is a negligible function of λ.
We mention that if we wish that our NIVS of Section 3 satisfy privacy in the
public-coin model, we need to assume a stronger variant of the above definition
in which the adversary also sees the random coins used to generate the bilinear
instance.
2.3 NIZK in the RO
Let R be an efficiently computable binary relation. For pairs (x,w) ∈ R we call x
the statement and w the witness. Let L be the language consisting of statements
in R.
Definition 3 [NIZK] A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system (NIZK, in
short), see [BFM88,FLS90], in the RO model, see [BR93,BFW15], for a relation
R consists of the following PPT algorithms with access to an oracle O randomly
drawn from a space O of functions with domain and co-domain {0, 1}λ:
– ProveO(·)(x,w): takes as input a statement x and a witness w for x, and with
oracle access to O produces a proof pi.
– VerifyO(·)(x, pi): takes in input a statement x and a proof pi, and with oracle
access to O outputs 1 if the proof is accepted and 0 otherwise.
We call NIZK a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for R if it has
the properties described below.
– Perfect completeness. A proof system is complete if an honest prover with a
valid witness can convince an honest verifier. Formally we have that for any
(x,w) ∈ R
Pr[O ← O; pi ← ProveO(·)(x,w) : VerifyO(·)(x, pi) = 1] = 1 .
– Statistical soundness. A proof system is sound if it is infeasible to convince
an honest verifier when the statement is false. For all (even unbounded)
non-uniform adversaries A we have
Pr[O ← O; ∃(x, pi) : VerifyO(·)(x, pi) = 1 ∧ x /∈ L] = negl(λ) .
– (Adaptive Multi-theorem) Computational zero-knowledge [BFW15]. A proof
system is computational zero-knowledge6 in the RO model if the proofs do
not reveal any information about the witnesses to a bounded adversary. We
say a non-interactive proof NIZK is computational zero-knowledge if there
exists a PPT stateful simulator Sim = (Sim.RO,Sim) that without access
to the witness can simulate proofs having in addition the capability of pro-
gramming the oracle O at any point, i.e, for any x and y it is able to set
O(x)
4
= y. For all non-uniform PPT adversaries A with access to an oracle
O, we have that the following quantity is negligible in λ:
|Pr[O ← O : AO(·),ProveO(·)2 (·,·)(1λ) = 1]−
Pr[O ← O : ASim.ROO(·),SimO(·)2 (·,·)(1λ) = 1]| ,
where Prove
O(·)
2 (x,w)
4
= ProveO(·)(x,w) for (x,w) ∈ R, SimO(·)2 (x,w)
4
=
SimO(·)(x) for (x,w) ∈ R, the latter oracles output ⊥ for (x,w) /∈ R and
Sim.RO simulates the oracle O possibly modifying it at an arbitrary num-
ber of points.
NIZK in the RO for encryption of 0 or 1. Recall that Hao et al. used a
protocol of Cramer et al. [CDS94] to prove that their ballot correspond to a vote
of either 0 or 1. To that aim they convert the terms of their protocol into the form
of ElGamal encryptions by seeing the pair (g, gyi) terms as El Gamal PKs and
thus seeing the pair gxi , gyixigvi as an El Gamal encryption with randomness
xi, public-key g
yi and plaintext vi. The Cramer et al.’s sigma protocol can prove
that vi is either 0 or 1 without revealing which. Using the Fiat-Shamir’s heuristic
[FS87] (see also [BFW15] for discussions about adaptiveness) it can be converted
in a NIZK in the RO model.
6 Note that our definition of zero-knowledgeness is multi-theorem and adaptive like in
[BFW15].
In our work we need a NIZK in the RO for a relation identical as above
except that g is an element of the target group of a bilinear group. Specifically
the variable g above takes the form g
4
= e(g′,Hash(I, s)) where g′ is an element
of a bilinear group, I is a bilinear instance, s is some string and Hash is an hash
function mapping the input to the base group.
It is straightforward to see that the protocol of Cramer et al. also work when g
has this form. In fact the computational assumption on which the security of the
sigma protocol of Cramer et al. depends, also holds when the underlying group is
the target group of a bilinear group, and in particular when the generator of such
group has the above form. This is easy to verify assuming standard assumptions
on bilinear maps, but in order not to overburden the presentation we skip the
details.
Precisely our relation Rwf is the following.
Definition 4 [Relation Rwf ] Rwf(x,w)
4
= 1 if x = (I, g, A,B,C) consists of a
bilinear instance I 4= (p,G,GT , e) and a triple of 3 elements of GT and w =
(x, y, v) are such that A = gy, B = gx, C = gxygv.
3 NIVS for YES/NO elections
In this Section we present our NIVS for YES/NO elections.
Definition 5 [NIVS for YES/NO elections] Let O and O2 be two random or-
acles (that in the implementation will be set to two secure hash functions,
e.g., SHA3). Let G be a generator for a bilinear instance of prime order, let
NIZK = (ProveO,VerifyO) be a NIZK in the RO for the relation Rwf of Defini-
tion 4. Let n(λ) be the number of voters, D
4
= {0, 1} be the domain of valid
votes, Σ
4
= [n] and F the sum function. Furthermore, we assume that the ora-
cle O2 takes as input a description of a bilinear instance I = (p,G,GT , e) and
maps strings from {0, 1}λ to G, and that oracle O maps strings from {0, 1}λ to
{0, 1}p(?) for some polynomial p(·) as needed by NIZK.
We define a (n,D,Σ, F )-NIVS
NIVS = (Setup,KeyGen,Cast,VerifyBallot,EvalTally) in the RO model as follows.
– Setup(1λ): on input the security parameter in unary, it outputs pp
4
= I where
I 4= (p,G,GT , e)← G(1λ).
– KeyGen(pp): on input the public parameters pp
4
= (g, p,G,GT , e), the algo-
rithm chooses a random x← Zp and outputs the pair (Pk 4= gx,Sk 4= x).
– Cast(pp, j, id,Sk, (Pk)i∈[n]−{j}, v), on input the public parameters pp, the
secret-key Sk
4
= x of voter j, the identifier id of the election, the pub-
lic keys (Pki)i∈[v]−{j} of the other voters, and a vote v ∈ D, outputs a
pair (Blt, pi) where the ballot Blt
4
= e(Yj , O2(I, id))Sk · e(g,O2(I, id))v, where
Yj
4
=
∏
i<j Pki/
∏
j>i Pki = g
∑
i<j xi−
∑
i>j xi and pi is the proof computed by
NIZK.ProveO with witness xi and v of the fact that the ballot is well-formed
and v ∈ {0, 1}.
– VerifyBallot(pp,Pk, id,Blt), on input the public parameters pp, a public-key
Pk of a voter, the identifier id ∈ {0, 1}λ of the election and a ballot Blt 4=
(Blt, pi), outputs OK if NIZK.VerifyO(Blt, pi) = 1 or ⊥ otherwise.
– EvalTally(pp,Pk1, . . . ,Pkn, id,Blt1, . . . ,Bltn), on input the public parameters
pp, the public-keys of all voters, the identifier id ∈ {0, 1}λ of the election,
and the ballots cast by all voter, computes what follows.
It runs VerifyBallot on any ballot Blti, i ∈ [n] and if for any ballot the ver-
ification fails, it outputs ⊥. Otherwise it computes R = ∏i∈[n] Blti and by
brute force computes r
4
= dloge(g,O2(I,id))R. Finally, the algorithm outputs
r.
3.1 Properties and security of the scheme
Correctness. It is straightforward to verify that the scheme satisfy the correct-
ness as, by construction of the yi’s it follows that
∑
xiyi = 0.
Verifiability. The verifiability follows from the statistical soundness of NIZK.
Privacy. We prove Theorem 1 using a standard hybrid argument. Assume by
contradiction that there exist a PPT adversary A with non-negligible advantage
in the privacy game. To that aim we define a sequence of hybrid experiments
against a non-uniform PPT adversary A attacking the privacy game by asking
at most q queries to its oracle Vote and we prove their computational indistin-
guishability.
– H0. This correspond to the privacy experiment when the challenge bit is set
to 0.
– H1. This experiment is identical to H0 except that the NIZK proofs are
simulated.
Claim 1 Indistinguishability of H1 from H0. The indistinguishability of the
two experiments follow from the computational zero-knowledge of NIZK.
– Hi,j , for i ∈ [q], j = 0, . . . , n. The experiment Hi,j for i ∈ [q], j = 1, . . . , n
is identical to H1 except that the first i − 1 queries are answered as if the
challenge bit were b
4
= 1 (i.e., the adversary receives a set of ballots for the
vector v1), and the i-th query is answered in the following way.
Let v0,v1 be the two vectors for the i-th query. Please remember that the two
vectors have equal Hamming weight. Through a set of intermediate vectors
vj ’s we want to change v0 to v1 from left to right by swapping bits. We
compute a vector vj in the following iterative way where we set v0
4
= v0.
For j = 1, . . . , n we update vj as follows. At the beginning we set vj
4
= vj−1.
If vj−1j = v1,j or j = n then leave it unchanged, i.e, v
j 4= vj−1, otherwise find
the next index lj ∈ [n], lj > j such that vj−1j = 1− vj−1lj and v1,j = 1− v1,lj .
Such index lj exists. In fact if v
j−1
j 6= v1,j and j < n then, since the sum∑
i v
j−1
i =
∑
i v1,i (see below), there exists at least one index lj such that
vj−1lj = 1−v1,lj and the differences are opposite v
j−1
lj
−v1,lj = −(vj−1j −v1,j).
In this case we set vjj
4
= v1,j and v
j
lj
= v1,lj . For the same reason, for j = n
then vnn = v1,n. Note that for any j = 0, 1, . . . , n the so formed vector v
j is
such that
∑
i v
j
i =
∑
i v0,i =
∑
i v1,i, and such that v
j equals v1 in the first
j positions.
Then in experiment Hi,j the i-th query is answered with respect to the
vector vj . We set H1,0
4
= H1 and for i = 2, . . . , q we set Hi,0 to be identical
to Hi−1,n,
Note that for any i ∈ [q] in the experiment Hi,n the so computed vector
vn = v1, where v1 is one of the two vectors on which the adversary queries
its Vote oracle in the i-th query.
An example of how the vector vj , j = 0, . . . , n is changed in the consecutive
hybrid experiments is given in Figure 1.
Let n = 5 and v0 = (10101) and v1 = (01011) be the vectors asked by the adversary in query
i. Then, we have the following.
• In experiment Hi,0: v0 4= v0 4= (10101).
• In experiment Hi,1: we update v1 4= (01101) because v0 is such that v01 = 1 and v1,1 = 0
so we search in v1 for the next index l1 in which v
0 and v1 differ (and have opposite
difference) that in this case is l1
4
= 2.
• In experiment Hi,2: we leave v2 4= (01101) unchanged because v1 is such that v12 = v1,2.
• In experiment Hi,3: we update v3 4= (01011) because v2 is such that v23 = 1 and v1,3 = 0
so we search in v3 for the next index l3 in which v
2 and v1 differ (and have opposite
difference) that in this case is l3
4
= 4.
• In experiment Hi,4: we leave v4 4= (01011) unchanged because v3 is such that v4 = 1 and
v31,4 = 1.
• In experiment Hi,5: we leave v5 4= (01011) unchanged because v4 is such that v45 = 1 and
v1,5 = 1.
Note that in all experiments the vector v has the same Hamming weight.
Fig. 1. Example of how the vector vj is iteratively updated in the hybrid experi-
ments Hi,j’s.
Claim 2 Indistinguishability of Hi,j−1 from Hi,j , for i ∈ [q], j = 1, . . . , n. The
indistinguishability of the two experiments follow from the BDDH Assump-
tion.
Proof. Suppose that the vector vj−1 used in experiment Hi,j−1 differs from
v1 in position j, otherwise the experiments are identical and the proof is
concluded. Let lj > j be the index such that v
j−1
j = 1 − vj−1lj and v1,j =
1− v1,lj . Such index exist by the assumption that the Hamming weights of
v0 and v1 is equal and from the fact that for any j = 0, . . . , n the vectors v
j
have same Hamming weight. Without loss of generality let us assume that
vj−1j = 1 and v
j−1
lj
= 0 (the other case is symmetrical). We construct a PPT
adversary B against the BDDH (with respect to generator of the bilinear
instance G) as follows.
B receives as input a bilinear instance I = (p,G,GT , e) and a tuple (g,A,B,C, Z)
of group elements where A
4
= ga, B
4
= gb, C
4
= gc are random group elements
of G and Z is either e(g, g)abc or a random element in GT . B can use I to
generate the public parameters pp and executes the adversary A on it. Then
A outputs the set S of corrupted voters and B computes the PKs and SKs
in the following way.
Note that S can not contain j and lj by the constraint in the winning
condition. B sets Pkj = A and Pklj = B and for any i 6= j, lj it chooses
si ← Zp and sets Pki = gsi . This implicitly defines Ski 4= si, for i 6= j, lj ,
Skj
4
= a and Sklj
4
= b. Note also that B ⊆ {i}i6=j,lj .
Therefore, B executes A with input the PKs and the SKs corresponding to
set S (and it can do that as it knows the secret-keys Ski
4
= si, i ∈ S). B
answers an oracle query id to O2 by setting O2(I, x) 4= gxid for xid ← Zp and
by setting O2(I, id?) = C where id? is the identifier used by A in the i-th
query.
With this setting, it is easy to see that B can simulate all queries k 6= i
queries using the group elements A,B, the values si’s and xid’s.
For the i-th query, B can set Bltk for k 6= j, lj by using A,B,C and the values
si’s. Finally, it sets Bltj
4
= e(A,C)
∑
i<j si−
∑
i>j,i6=lj si · Z−1 · e(g, C)vj−1j and
Bltlj
4
= e(B,C)
∑
i<lj,i 6=j si−
∑
i>j si ·Z ·e(g, C)v
j−1
lj Note that if Z
4
= e(g, g)abc
then Bltj and Bltlj are distributed like in experiment Hi,j−1. For instance,
Bltlj
4
= e(B,C)
∑
i<lj,i 6=j si−
∑
i>j si · Z · e(g, C)v
j−1
lj
4
=
e(g,O2(I, id?))Sklj (
∑
i<lj,i 6=j Ski−
∑
i>j Ski) · Z · e(g, C)v
j−1
lj
4
=
e(g,O2(I, id?))Sklj (
∑
i<lj,i 6=j Ski−
∑
i>j Ski) · e(g, g)abc · e(g, C)v
j−1
lj
4
=
e(g,O2(I, id?))Sklj (
∑
i<lj,i 6=j Ski−
∑
i>j Ski)·e(g,O2(I, id?))SkjSklj ·e(g, C)v
j−1
lj
4
=
e(gyj , O2(I, id?))Sklj · e(g,O2(I, id?))v
j−1
lj .
Similarly for Bltj . Hence, Bltj (resp. Bltlj ) is distributed correctly as output
of the Cast algorithm for identifier id, set of PKs {Pki}i∈[n], SK Ski 4= a
(resp. Sklj
4
= b) and vote vj−1j (resp. v
j−1
lj
).
On the other hand if Z is uniform in GT then it is equal to e(g, g)z for
some z ∈ Zp. Setting z 4= z′ + logg C for z′ 4= z − logg C and by recall-
ing that we assumed that vj−1j = 1 and v
j−1
lj
= 0, we see that Bltj =
e(A,C)
∑
i<j si−
∑
i>j,i6=lj si · e(g, g)−z′ · e(g, C)v
j−1
lj and
Bltlj = e(B,C)
∑
i<lj,i 6=j si−
∑
i>j si · e(g, g)z′ · e(g, C)vj−1j .
Let us call HRnd,v
j−1
i the previous experiment simulated by B when Z is
uniform in GT and the i-th query is answered with vector vj−1. What we
showed before implies that experiment HRnd,v
j−1
i is distributed identically
to an experiment HRnd,v
j
i that is identical to H
Rnd,vj−1
i except that the i-th
query is answered with vj . Moreover, if Z
4
= e(g, g)abc then B simulates
perfectly experiment Hi,j−1. By BDDH, Hi,j−1 ≈c HRnd,v
j−1
i ≡ HRnd,v
j
i .
Furthermore, by symmetry it is easy to see that Hi,j ≈c HRnd,v
j
i , and thus
we conclude that Hi,j−1 ≈c Hi,j as we had to prove.
Note that the hybrid H1,0 is by definition identical to the real experiment for
bit b
4
= 0 and Hq,n is identical to the real experiment for bit b
4
= 1. Thus, the
indistinguishability of these two experiments implies that no PPT non-uniform
adversary has non-negligible advantage in the privacy game.
4 Future directions
The most urgent problem to tackle is to add robustness, as defined by Hao et
al., without sacrificing non-interactiveness. In fact, if just a single voter does not
cast her vote, the other voters cannot compute the result of the election. In our
non-interactive case this problem is subtle as it seems to clash with privacy, and
new definitions and techniques are needed. Another open problem is upgrade
the privacy security and provide receipt-freeness. This could in turn be used to
give an alternative solution to the problem of the anonymity difference between
non-interactive elections and central elections for non-standard tally functions.
Another intriguing open problem is to extend the class of the functions that
we can support beyond e-voting. From the applied side we made a preliminary
implementation (available on request) using the pbc library [Lyn] in linux and we
expect to port it in Java [CI11]. It would be nice to implement our primitives in
real-world applications, e.g., a conference revision system like [Hal] or a facebook
app like in [BIPT11].
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